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 ABSTRACT 
 
Research in the pre-paradigmatic, applied scientific field of entrepreneurship is 
characterized mainly as exploratory.  This article advocates for a considerable shift toward a 
more effective applied research agenda. An applied research program is proposed based on 
modifications to a Lakatosian research program.  The agenda extends beyond typical calls for 
more replication work to include a focus on practical outcomes, practical significance, and 
surprising findings among other things.  The intent is to produce substantially more practical 
knowledge – knowledge that is useful to entrepreneurs, policy makers, educators and scholars.   
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Venkataraman (1997), Shane and Venkataraman (2000) and Shane (2003) have 
attempted to realign research in the field of entrepreneurship around the idea of practical 
dependent variables focused on opportunity identification and opportunity execution.  Shane’s 
(2003) interpretation of opportunity execution included various practical entrepreneurial 
outcomes ranging from starting a company to going public.  Defining an applied social science 
such as entrepreneurship in terms of practical dependent variables is a crucial first step in the 
search for practical knowledge.  
 
A pragmatic person might wonder to what extent entrepreneurship researchers pursue 
practical research programs in order to uncover knowledge useful for entrepreneurs, policy 
makers, educators and scholars.  If a pragmatist closely examined research in the emerging field 
of entrepreneurship over the last thirty years, s/he would likely notice that the field better 
approximates a world of loosely connected single studies than one of meaningfully-integrated 
research programs – Forscher's (1963) brickyard problem.  Further, many researchers come into 
the field very briefly in order to publish a single article (c.f. Cornelius et al., 2006).  Many of 
those who remain frequently switch topics rather than steadfastly focus on a single research area 
for an extended period of time.  Additionally, a very small percentage of scholars contributes 
more than a couple of peer-reviewed articles during a career (Gartner et al., 2006). 
 
In addition to scholar transience, topic-hopping and low productivity concerns, the field 
must also face problems related to replication.  Replication studies are often overlooked in favor 
of original work in peer-reviewed journals.  Moreover, when conducted, replication studies 
usually do not support initial findings (Hubbard & Vetter, 1996; Evanschitzky et al., 2007).  The 
failure of various types of replications (across management fields) alone should be enough to 
raise concern with respect to the bulk of our practical entrepreneurship knowledge.   
 
There are a number of other steps that the field must take.  Our practical knowledge must 
be reliable and robust.  It is not enough for a single study to be done to identify a predictor of one 
or more desirable entrepreneurial outcomes.  Entrepreneurs should be provided with replicated 
evidence of the validity of constructs and the confidence that desirable outcomes follow from 
key predictors (Aldrich, 1992; Chandler & Lyon, 2001; Davidsson, 2004; Kane, 1984; Rosenthal 
and Rosnow, 1984).  Entrepreneurs also need to know that that a predictor is broadly useful, 
rather than limited to a very narrow set of circumstances (Hubbard & Vetter, 1996).  
Entrepreneurs want new knowledge that is not blatantly obvious – it should be rather surprising 
instead of common sense (Ladik & Stewart, 2008; Armstrong, 2003).  Entrepreneurs want a 
predictor to be cost effective (Gouldner, 1957; Drummond & McGuire, 1997), as well as 
something that they can directly influence (Gouldner, 1957).  Further, entrepreneurs would like 
to believe that it all makes sense – that there are good and compelling reasons for believing that 
changing a predictor, A, will result in a change in a desired outcome, B.   
 
As most researchers know, the list of practical demands above is a tall order for any 
research program.  Nonetheless, it is important to establish specific objectives for any applied 
social science in order to more effectively direct research efforts.  This article is proposed as a 
step in the direction toward more effectively organizing work in the field of entrepreneurship
1
.  It 
is shown below that the field of entrepreneurship, like so many social sciences, is not yet able to 
make use of the intellectual devices developed by Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos.  Instead, our 
proposal for a new ‘applied research program agenda’ here may allow the field to evolve to a 
point at which substantial pragmatically useful knowledge is commonly generated
2
. 
 
 
 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
 
It has appeared to some observers that the dominant philosophy of science in the business 
disciplines continues to be logical positivism (c.f. Cohen, 2007; Meyer, 2009).  Core logical 
positivist values include a distrust of metaphysics (i.e. theory) and a pursuit of objective facts.  
The unit of analysis is the protocol statement, a single factual statement linking together tightly-
operationalized variables.  The nature of truth is based on correspondence theory in which 
empirical findings correspond to an external reality according to their truth value.  Hence, the 
                                                 
1
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Collaboration in the field of medicine as a model for effectively organizing research. 
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 Our fundamental interest, to advance scholarship, aligns closely with that of Peng & Dess (2010).   
role of the scientist is to uncover disparate pieces of concrete conceptual knowledge about the 
real world.   
 
Logical positivism began to lose its appeal amongst philosophers of science for a variety 
of reasons in the 1960s.    Ultimately, most philosophers adopted a perspective that neither 
subjectivity nor theory could be avoided in the scientific process.  Logical positivism, it should 
be noted, can offer value to a new field searching for basic factual knowledge.  For example, it 
influences scientists to be wary of the slippage between concept and operationalization, 
encouraging them to collect multiple observations.   
 
The dominant replacements for logical positivism are widely considered to be the 
intellectual contributions of Sir Karl Popper (1963) and of Thomas S. Kuhn (1962).  One might 
also include the work of Imre Lakatos (1978), who attempted to reconcile the works of both 
Popper and Kuhn.  These three philosophers each worked from units of analysis more 
encompassing than the protocol statements emphasized by logical positivists.  Popper separated 
theory into two categories: scientific theory, which made bold/risky predictions; and pre-
scientific theory, which could not claim such predictions.  Kuhn developed the notions of 
prescience and scientific paradigm.  Lakatos emphasized research programs, which involved 
complex clusters of interconnected theories.  Popper and Lakatos adopted the correspondence 
theory of truth and were decidedly prescriptive in their philosophies.  Kuhn, on the other hand, 
adopted a consensus theory of truth and in the process, imbued his philosophy of science with a 
decidedly descriptive emphasis upon the realpolitik of scientific decision-making. 
 
For Popper’s philosophy of conjecture and refutation to be meaningfully employed in an 
emerging applied social science such as entrepreneurship, there are two necessary prerequisites.  
First, entrepreneurship researchers would need to draw a strong line between predictive, 
scientific theories and explanatory, pre-scientific theories.  Empirical research would largely be 
confined to testing the former.  Currently, there is little indication of such a distinction being 
made within the entrepreneurship field.   
 
Second, research undertaken on predictive theory must strongly test the predictive 
relationships advocated by a theory.  The extent to which such work occurs in entrepreneurship 
is debatable.  A recent review of tests of human capital theory, one of the most used theories in 
the top entrepreneurship journals (Kenworthy & McMullan, 2010), suggests that strong theory 
testing may not be commonplace.  Human capital theory (HCT) clearly predicts that financial 
investments in, e.g. formal education and experience, will yield positive financial returns over 
time. Researchers in entrepreneurship, unlike those in economics, chose to not measure 
investment costs in any of the fifty-six studies reviewed.  Instead, entrepreneurship researchers 
loosely invoked HCT in order to draw linkages between human capital variables and a wide 
variety of other phenomena.  Furthermore, failures to support hypotheses were typically treated 
as un-interpretable or invalid.  Such pre-scientific behaviors are evidence that the field of 
entrepreneurship may not be prepared to adopt a Popperian philosophy. 
 
Kuhn, like Popper, has much to offer, but not at this time to the field of entrepreneurship.  
A scientific field needs a paradigm in order to use Kuhn’s ideas.  In the 1960s, Kuhn viewed his 
work as mainly contributing to the hard sciences, as in his estimation, the social sciences lacked 
any paradigms.  Though Kuhn may be debated today, there is little doubt that the field of 
entrepreneurship is pre-paradigmatic (c.f. Zahra, 2005) and therefore, not yet ready for Kuhnian 
analysis. 
 
Lakatos’ provocative research program concept relies on the existence of at least one 
strongly-predictive scientific theory.  It involves, among other things, a number of auxiliary 
theories that must also be taken into consideration in order to comment on the progressive or 
degenerative nature of a research program.  According to Blaug (1975), the notion of a 
Lakatosian research program has extremely limited usage within the entirety of the social 
sciences. 
 
 
  
ASPECTS OF APPLIED RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
 
The problem that we face may be formulated in the following terms: how does a 
disparate group of occasionally interacting social scientists participate in meaningful, cumulative 
programs of applied research?  How does our research culture shift towards cumulative 
programmatic research and away from a predominant focus on single studies?  Our proposed 
solution is for scholars to have a common understanding of the requirements of an applied 
research program and therefore a common knowledge development agenda 
 
We contend that our proposed solution is viable and achievable in part because of the 
existence of a few largely uncoordinated applied research programs that have produced some of 
our most important entrepreneurship knowledge.  Hence, it would seem that at least some 
researchers are already asking the types of practical questions about research findings that we 
discuss here.  Some questions such as whether or not a research finding is replicable are standard 
scientific concerns.  Others, such as whether or not specific control variables can be manipulated 
in a cost effective manner, are less standard. 
 
It is worth pointing out that applied research program agendas are not always directed by 
explicit, formalized theory.  This may be surprising to at least some people who tend to see 
theory as the dominant research-directing mechanism (c.f. Popper, 1963; Zahra, 2007).  
Sometimes, the types of research programs that we argue for here, e.g. job generation research, 
occur largely in the absence of explicit theory.  Of course, this is not to say that there is no 
relevant theory.  It is simply suggested that theoretical guidance need not be driven by formally 
explicated theory.  To be scientifically useful, theory must be used in an informed fashion and an 
applied research agenda (such as that which we advocate) should provide more comprehensive 
direction to the testing of theory.  
 
 
 
An Applied Research Program Agenda 
 
The construction of an applied research program (ARP) agenda involves both philosophy 
of science and practical concerns.  As such, defining characteristics of an ARP are subject to 
criticism.  We offer a set of eight characteristics that indicate the nature of scientific work to be 
included in applied research programs. Four of the characteristics are fundamental for the 
definition of an ARP.  The other four characteristics arguably designate a desirable knowledge 
expansion strategy. 
 The four fundamental characteristics of an ARP are, as follows: 
 
 
Practical Outcomes  In order for a set of studies to constitute an applied research program, at 
least some of the studies need to focus on practical outcomes.  A focus on practical outcomes 
implies that the dependent variables in tested models need grounding in practical issues typically 
of concern to entrepreneurs (c.f. Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003).  Entrepreneurs 
are interested in investing in variables that most influence economic outcomes such as revenue 
and profit growth. 
 
There can also be instances in which dependent variables in the field of entrepreneurship are of 
less concern to entrepreneurs but still of concern to scholars, educators and policy makers.  Job 
creation (Birch, 1979), for example, is strongly associated with entrepreneurship, but it is of little 
interest to specific entrepreneurs.  Instead, the job creation findings substantially influence 
government support and programming for new ventures. 
 
 
Evidence of Replicability  In order for a set of studies to constitute an applied research program 
they collectively must exhibit evidence of replicability.  In 2002, Dov Eden (p. 844), an editor of 
the Academy of Management Journal, proclaimed that, “…replication research is indispensable 
for scientific progress.”  His strong belief is held across the social sciences (Dewald, Thursby & 
Anderson, 1986; Feigenbaum & Levy, 1993; Tsang & Kwan, 1999).  Unfortunately, the 
publication of replication studies work is uncommon across many scientific fields, including the 
business disciplines.  According to Hubbard and Vetter (1996), replication work in leading 
business journals represents less than 10% of published empirical work in accounting, 
economics, and finance and 5% or less of published empirical work in management and 
marketing.   
 
To identify a number of studies as a progressive applied research stream, many of those studies 
must have developed evidence of replicability.  There must be credible evidence to convince 
scholars and practitioners that research findings will remain consistent across time, contexts and 
cultures, and research methodologies.  Exceptions should only exist when explicitly predicted or 
otherwise appreciated as ad hoc adjustments to the generalizability of the findings. 
 
 
Practical Significance  In order for a collection of studies to be considered an applied research 
program, the findings must exhibit practical significance, rather than mere statistical 
significance.  “Statistical significance,” according to Kirk (1996, p. 746), “is concerned with 
whether a research result is due to chance or sampling variability; practical significance is 
concerned with whether the result is useful in the real world.”  Statistical significance is often 
investigated via null hypothesis significance testing, a technique that has been heavily criticized 
by leading social scientists (c.f. Carver, 1978; Cohen, 1990; Meehl, 1967; Rozeboom, 1960; 
Schmidt, 1996).   
 
Kirk (1996) refers to the measures of practical significance as measures of effect magnitude.  
The magnitude or strength of a relationship, i.e. the amount of variance accounted for in the 
dependent variable, can be measured in a variety of ways, the most popular being Cohen’s d. 
 
It appears that effect sizes are already being reported to some extent in entrepreneurship studies 
and that effect sizes are higher than expected (Connelly et al., 2010).  Such findings bode well 
for the development of practically-significant knowledge that is useful to entrepreneurs and other 
relevant stakeholders. 
 
 
Unexpected Findings  In order for a set of studies to constitute an applied research program they 
must provide findings that go beyond common sense. 
 
 
Surprising findings differ from current practice or current beliefs…Surprising 
findings may be innovative or new, although not always. When the problem is 
important, surprising findings are likely to be controversial or unpopular.  
Armstrong (2003, p. 71-72) 
 
 
An applied research program cannot only accept findings that support existing theories and 
contentions.  It must be open to surprising and counter-intuitive findings.  Such findings can be 
generated from implicitly theoretical research or from strongly predictive theories that, when 
right, set up ‘damn strange coincidences’ (Salmon, 1984).  Counterintuitive findings, according 
to Lindsay et al. (1998, p. 215), “…demonstrate the superiority of science over common sense.”  
In the early 1960s, the field of social psychology, from which entrepreneurship research draws a 
number of theories, went through a transition from demonstrating the obvious to focusing on 
counterintuitive effects.  The shift toward non-obvious findings led to a number of productive 
research consequences including increased researcher enthusiasm; unexpected research results; 
and, productive debate (Kelley, 1992). 
 
 
Such a set of defining characteristics should help us recognize findings, theoretically 
supported or otherwise, that hold practical potential for entrepreneurs.  When identifying a 
current research program we recommend that scholars appreciate and accommodate the factors 
that tend to bias published research findings (Meehl, 1990).  Most commonly, we suggest that 
researchers take into consideration the totality of both supporting and non-supporting findings 
despite some additional difficulties associated with the interpretation of non-supporting findings. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
The next four agenda characteristics expand the usefulness of entrepreneurship 
knowledge: 
 
Address Why and How  An applied research program attempts to answer the how and why 
questions. According to Whetten (1989), how and why are two of the essential building blocks 
for effective theory development.  The how building block handles the manner in which factors 
(i.e. variables, constructs and/or concepts) are related to each other.  The key relationships, and 
their complexities, are typically depicted graphically for purposes of presentation, testing and 
refinement.  The why building block offers a rhetorical explanation for the underlying logic (i.e. 
a theory’s assumptions) of the causal model.   According to Sutton and Staw (1995, p. 376), 
good theory should be, “…rich enough that processes have to be described with sentences and 
paragraphs so as to convey the logical nuances behind the causal arrow.” 
 
 
 
 
 Controllable Variables 
 
…the applied social scientist is concerned not merely with identifying 
predictively potent independent variables, but also with discovering some that 
are accessible to control. 
        Gouldner (1957, p. 97) 
 
 
An applied research program makes an attempt to identify variables that can be manipulated by 
practitioners (Bauer, 1951; Gouldner, 1957).  Controllable variables such as business strategies 
are desirable because they enable entrepreneurs to directly influence survival, growth and 
success. 
 
The distinction between uncontrollable and controllable variables does not, however, imply that 
uncontrollable variables should be dismissed.  According to Hobbs (1969, p. 243), 
“…uncontrollable variables are important from the standpoint that they may establish the context 
of change, or the limits of effect of controllable variables.”   
 
 
 
Eliminate Alternative Explanations 
 
For those of us who grant that theory testing is meaningful…this lack of testing is 
an undesirable state of affairs…these tests should be comparative - that is, against a 
rival paradigm or research program (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970). 
        (Pahre, 1996, p. 221) 
 
 An applied research program attempts to eliminate alternative explanations for phenomena under 
observation.  The ubiquitous existence of multiple explanations is typically known as under-
determination.  The process to reduce under-determination involves strong attempts to refute 
rival scientific theories.  Though refutation may be a strong word, the idea is that the type of 
applied research program described here positions the field of entrepreneurship to examine 
scientific evidence and weigh the relative strengths of competing theories against each other.  
The outcome is stronger applied knowledge about, e.g. new venture survival and success. 
 
 
Cost-effective Solutions  An applied research program should uncover numerous controllable 
variables that vary in magnitude and implementation costs.  Hence, an applied research program 
will also undertake to examine and compare the cost-effectiveness of the most powerful 
controllable variables.  Cost-effectiveness analysis (c.f. the field of medicine – McClellan & 
Newhouse, 1997; Stinnett and Mullahy, 1998) compares incremental cost and incremental 
effectiveness of existing versus new interventions based on empirical results.  The results of 
cost-effectiveness analysis allow entrepreneurs to make more informed decisions about key 
aspects of starting and growing new ventures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF APPLIED RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
 
Two illustrations of applied research programs are described below. The first illustration 
involves the development of knowledge with respect to entrepreneurship and job generation.  In 
this case, a highly provocative finding directly influenced scholars from around the world to seek 
replications and/or refutations.  The second illustration, that of using creativity to predict 
entrepreneurial performance, is interesting because it appears that the researcher efforts involved 
were much less coordinated than in the job generation case. 
 
 
Entrepreneurship and Job Generation 
 
David Birch (1979) found that 81.5% of all net new jobs created in the US from 1969 to 
1976 were located in small firms with less than 100 employees.  Birch’s finding was not just 
statistically significant but practically significant, as well.  The evidence influenced policy 
makers around the world to vigorously promote various small business initiatives.  For many 
neo-classical economists, however, the counter-intuitive findings flew in the face of both theory 
and ideology.  Replications, cross-validations, extensions and practical significance studies 
ensued.  An early US-based replication study (Armington & Odle, 1982) indicated that only 
35.8% of net new jobs created were by small firms, and that Birch was wrong.  However, the 
study used a traditional, static measure of job creation and further, it was restricted to data from a 
recessionary period.     
 
Armington (1983) and Armington and Odle (1983) conducted more sophisticated 
replications of the Birch (1979) study and found in favor of the dominance of entrepreneurial 
(i.e. new small business) job generation.  In 1987, Birch found that companies with 1-19 
employees accounted for 82% of net job creation and large firms (i.e. with 5000+ employees) 
suffered net losses of 13.5%.   
 
In the UK, Doyle & Gallagher (1987) found that only companies in the 1-to-19 employee 
category showed employment growth.  Blanchflower and Burgess (1996) found that 
establishments with less than 100 employees accounted for a disproportionately large share of 
job creation and for destruction, a disproportionately small share.  In Canada, Picot, Baldwin & 
Dupuy (1994, 1998) found that a disproportionate share of employment was created over the 
short and long runs by small firms during recessions and recoveries.  Over a three year period, 
5% of small firms created 43% of jobs.  In Norway, Spilling (1996) found that 1% of new 
establishments accounted for 44.8% of total job creation over a nine-year time frame.  Further, 
2.4% of new establishments accounted for 57.9% of total job creation.  In Sweden, Davidsson et 
al. (1998) found that small firms outperformed large firms in terms of gross and net job 
generation.   
 
Back in the US, the Small Business Administration (1998, 1999) developed a database 
for more accurately tracking interclass movement.  An analysis of the data revealed that 75% of 
net new jobs from 1990 to 1995 were created by small businesses (<500 employees).  Further, 
the small business job generation rate was almost triple the large business (500+) rate: 10.5% and 
3.7%, respectively. 
 
Over the years, only a small number of studies have not replicated the Birch (1979) 
finding.  White and Osterman (1991) reviewed Wisconsin unemployment records and found that 
two and four-digit SIC analyses reveal that, longitudinally, small firms do not account for the 
bulk of net job generation.  Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1993, 1996) tackled what they 
considered the job generation myth by investigating the US manufacturing sector and reported 
that firms with at least 500 employees account for half of jobs generated.  Interestingly, the 
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1993, 1996) studies were heavily criticized by numerous 
economists and entrepreneurship scholars for data and method limitations and problems (c.f. 
Davidsson et al., 1998; Carree and Klomp, 1996; Kirchhoff and Greene, 1998). 
 
Ultimately, the initial Birch (1979) finding spawned a substantial program of research to 
further understand and interpret the macro-economic relevance of entrepreneurs.   
 
 
 
Creativity and Entrepreneurial Performance 
 
Joseph Schumpeter (1942) did not formally predict that more creative people will 
develop more successful businesses.  The notion does, however, appear to underlie his thinking.  
Thus, the post-Schumpeter creativity research in the field of entrepreneurship is more theory-
inspired than theory-directed.  A recent review of the extant creativity research uncovered 28 
empirical studies that linked creativity with entrepreneurship (McMullan, 2009).   
 
The creativity research program has grown slowly, over a thirty year period.  The articles 
are not very well-cited and they tend not to be published in top-rated journals.  The facts are, 
however, that many of the creativity researchers used practically relevant measures of outcomes 
such as start-up, growth and profitability.  The researchers conducted constructive replications 
and cross-validated findings by using different measures of creativity and substantially different 
sample populations from many different countries.  Moreover, a sizable number of studies found 
not only statistical significance but evidence of practical significance as well (c.f. Khan, 1987; 
Khan and MacMillan, 1988; Verhees and Meulenberg, 2004).  The proportion of outcome 
variance often accounted for in the creativity studies is surprisingly high in spite of measurement 
difficulties in the area of creativity (Clapham, 2004; Kaufman, 2006).  For most entrepreneurship 
scholars it is normal to expect entrepreneurs to be more creative than the average person, though 
anything but conventional wisdom to expect creativity to account for a substantial portion of 
entrepreneurial performance.   
 
With respect to the eight research program aspects addressed above, the creativity 
research evidence does a better job of establishing entrepreneurial creativity as an applied 
research program (requirements 1 – 4) than it does further developing the usefulness of this 
established knowledge (requirements 5 – 8).  The only attempt to study the enhancement of 
entrepreneurial creativity is disputably David McClelland’s work in India (McClelland and 
Winter, 1969), in which he attempted to enhance subjects’ need for achievement.  A cost-benefit 
analysis of such intervention strategies seems a long way off in part because control is a major 
problem in this line of research.  Nonetheless, there are occasional attempts at building 
theoretical explanations for such a relationship and useful empirical results may arise from 
facilitating better self-selection and more effective investment strategies. 
 
In summary, the empirical studies linking creativity with entrepreneurial performance 
generally meet the minimum requirements of the aforementioned applied research program 
agenda.  The success of this research program occurred in spite of what appears to be a lack of 
common knowledge about the various empirical findings amongst the participating creativity 
researchers.  This applied program of research may have been, more or less, accidentally 
spawned by the diversity of concepts and measures characterizing creativity, and by a number of 
people who envisaged the reasonableness of the idea of the creative entrepreneur. 
 
 
 
Comments on Illustrations 
 
The two illustrations above suggest that applied research programs, corresponding to the 
definition provided here, do occur naturally in the field of entrepreneurship.  There are also other 
examples.  The published empirical studies of the SBDC counseling effects is an example of an 
applied research program that has been coordinated for over 25 years by a single scholar, Jim 
Chrisman.  The need for achievement research is another example of an applied research 
program that existed due to efforts by a mainly uncoordinated group of researchers. 
 
Some of the applied research programs appear to be more explicitly theory-directed than 
others.  It is interesting to note that many people in the field of entrepreneurship likely believe 
that McClelland’s (1961) theory was the directional force behind the need for achievement 
research, and to an extent, this is the case.  McClelland created a theory that emphasized the 
importance of need for achievement in entrepreneurship as well as in economic development.  
Some of his key assumptions were that entrepreneurs represented an important dimension in 
economic growth and that entrepreneurial success and need for achievement were positively 
correlated.  McClelland’s theory, however, predicted that macro-level interventions would 
promote an entrepreneurially vibrant economy.  Hence, his theory did not provide direct 
effective guidance to the largely micro-level research on individual need to achieve.   
 
A similar argument could be constructed regarding the weak link between Joseph 
Schumpeter’s macro-level theory and the empirical research linking entrepreneurial creativity 
with entrepreneurial performance.  What is interesting about the insights here is that explicit 
theory played a limited role in guiding effective research.  This suggests that something other 
than formal theory can be used to direct the generation of useful knowledge.  Further, that the job 
generation and creativity research programs managed to cover the minimal requirements of an 
applied research program agenda suggests that some researchers already have mental models of 
useful knowledge that do not vary greatly from the research agenda being advanced here. 
 
 
 
 
 
PROGRESSIVE VERSUS DEGENERATIVE RESEARCH 
PROGRAMS IN APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
As previously mentioned, Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos each focused on different units of 
analysis in order to examine intellectual progress in the natural sciences.  They also analyzed the 
waxing and waning of research programs through those unitsBuilding on Popper and Kuhn, 
Lakatos (1970) advocated a model for the critical assessment of a research program.  He 
distinguished between advancing and declining (i.e. progressive and degenerative) research 
programs.  From Lakatos’ perspective, research programs tend not to be completely refuted.  
Instead, ongoing ad hoc adjustments are often made to models in order to save them from non-
supportive findings.  The accumulation of ad hoc modifications, however, may eventually lead 
researchers to acknowledge the limitations of a research program or merely lose interest in it. 
 
In the pre-paradigmatic social sciences (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1999), the Lakatosian notions 
of progressive and degenerative research programs require some adaptation to better suit the 
characteristics of applied research programs established above.  Below, we suggest six criteria 
that signal a degenerative program and promote disengagement from faltering research streams. 
 
 Failure to cross-replicate research results with different measures, with different sample 
population or under different circumstances. 
 Weakening of the explanatory power of predictors in better-controlled studies. 
 Failure to find controllable variables that can be modified to meaningfully affect new 
venture performance. 
 Failure to eliminate competing explanations, particularly when competing ones explain 
more of the phenomena of interest or more of the desired outcome variance. 
 Failure to find evidence that supports the cost-effective manipulation of controllable 
variables. 
 Increasing doubt due to spurious correlations or the existence of administrative artifacts 
that explain key relationships. 
 
 
 
The last suggested criterion, about spurious correlations, may represent the greatest threat to 
the long-term progress of promising research programs.  A key reason for the threat is that the 
social sciences do not typically allow for the kinds of controlled experiments found in some of 
the hard sciences that bolster confidence in the integrity of a cause and effect relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 IN SUMMARY 
 
The direction for non-cumulative, solo-study research has come, however implicitly, 
from logical positivism.  The influence of logical positivism has declined in philosophy of 
science and many scientific fields have sought to fashion research efforts around the ideas of 
Kuhn, Popper and Lakatos.  It is argued that the applied scientific field of entrepreneurship 
research should also transition away from the influence of logical positivism.  It is further argued 
that the natural replacements to logical positivism do not yet represent a good fit with the 
entrepreneurship field.   
 
An applied research program agenda is proposed to help direct the development of 
cumulative research towards practical knowledge.  The argument bears some things in common 
with the position papers advocating for more replication research but extends beyond the single 
issue of replication.  The elements of the proposed applied research program are recognizable as 
substantial modifications to the Lakatosian research program.  The entrepreneurship research 
program is, therefore, supported or refuted in a manner more appropriate for a pre-paradigmatic 
applied social science. 
 
The applied research agenda should encourage a critical mindset.  It should direct the 
development of knowledge across studies over time by helping entrepreneurship researchers to 
more critically appreciate the usefulness of extant and new findings, as well as determine what 
groupings of studies constitute promising applied research programs.   
 
It is important to point out that we do not suggest all independent studies to be without 
worth, but rather we demonstrate that the agenda required to develop practical knowledge is 
sufficiently time consuming and study intensive to require a substantially larger proportion of the 
global entrepreneurship research effort. 
 
In order to demonstrate that the advocated approach to knowledge development has been 
used to positive effect in entrepreneurship in the past, job generation and entrepreneurial 
creativity research efforts are described.  The outsider assistance research program spearheaded 
by Jim Chrisman is offered as another example.  Scholars in the entrepreneurship field are hence 
encouraged to identify additional existing applied research programs, evaluate their progress and 
propose future directions in line with the philosophy advocated here. 
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